I INTRODUCTION
The present article investigates how assignments of future property 1 might interact with the Torrens system. In doing so, it probes the intersection of two divergent forces: equity's pre-modern jurisdiction grounded in conscience and substance, and the relatively contemporary Torrens system, based on registration, administrative uniformity, and title certainty.
The article argues that there are no reasons why principles of future property cannot be fully subsumed within the Torrens system. More specifically, it contends that well established features of the Torrens system, such as caveats and the in personam exception to indefeasibility, would be readily applicable to future land 2 transactions and disputes.
The article consists of four main sections. Section II enumerates the general principles applicable to the assignment of future property. Section III examines aspects of the assignment of future land common to all land title types. Section IV specifically analyses the interactions between future property and the Torrens system. Most importantly, this section outlines the case for a new in personam claim: failure to assure future Torrens land. Section V synthesises all aspects of the preceding discussion and concludes that there are no barriers to the assignment of future land within the Torrens system.
II GENERAL PRINCIPLES
'Future property' 3 can be defined as, 'property which does not exist or in which the assignor at the time of the assignment has no proprietary interest.' 4 Or as defined by Heydon, Leeming and Turner:
By way of the terms 'future property', '(mere) expectancy', 'spes' or 'spes successionis' what is generally meant is a right or title which one has not yet acquired and lacks a legal right to acquire but which one may acquire in the future.
5
These definitions do not capture property anticipated as the result of a procedure of a chattel; this is instead termed 'potential property' and is considered to have a present existence, however counter-intuitive this might seem.
6
A legal assignment of future property is nugatory 7 as the law historically refused to give recognition to 'prophetic conveyance [s] .' 8 An assignment of future property can thus only be made in equity. 9 For this to occur, however, there must be valuable consideration to bind the assignor's
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17 there is no 'scintilla temporis or fragment of time during which the equitable interest' vests in the assignor. 18 The assignor will thus be required to transfer the legal title to the assignee forthwith. 19 In a technical sense, equity does not assign future property immediately upon the making of a contract for valuable consideration to do so, as this would be a practical impossibility: one cannot immediately assign something that one does not have. 20 Instead, equity 'activates' the formerly torpid agreement to assign once the legal title to the property is vested in the assignor as bare constructive trustee. 21 This has been characterised as a special application of the equitable maxim: equity regards that as done which ought to be done. 22 Finally, the assignee's right in equity to future property can be negated if the assignor sells the property to a bona fide purchaser for value without (Lawbook Company Limited, 1992) 999 (explaining that the trust is constructive). 17 [1987] 2 Qd R 134. 18 Ibid 135. 19 It has been suggested that 'one way in which equity supports such an assignment is by treating the transaction, though in form an assignment, as containing or importing a covenant to do that which is necessary to effect the validity of the assignment. ' See In re Mudge [1914] 26 Although at the abstract level it is certain that the doctrines of future property are applicable to land, in practice it is less certain exactly how this might occur. When analysing rules of future property vis-à-vis land, it is submitted that three initial issues require consideration: whether the land is future property; whether the assignment complies with any statutory requirements of writing; and how precisely the land must be described in order to make the assignment effective. Each are discussed seriatim below.
A Is the Land Future Property?
Land transactions usually involve present property. Typically, the assignor enters into a contract for the sale of land with the assignee, which is accompanied by the latter paying a ten per cent deposit. Six weeks ordinarily pass before settlement, whereupon the outstanding balance is paid by the assignee and the legal title is transferred. The key point which denotes that the agreement is one involving present property is that the assignor is the legal title holder at the time of making the contract with the assignee.
to, and may never obtain, to the assignee. 28 The key point which denotes that the agreement is one involving future property is that the assignor is not vested with the legal title at the time of making the agreement with the assignee, and whether this will in fact ever occur is a mere contingency (beyond the assignor's control). Thus, whenever there is an element of chance involved with the assignor acquiring the legal title to land, an assignment of future property will have occurred.
B Statutory Requirements of Writing
A statutory requirement of writing 29 applies to executory contracts for the sale of land. 30 An assignment of future land is by its nature executory, as there are still further steps necessary in order to finalise, or execute, the intended disposition of the legal title. Writing is therefore required.
31
It is often said, however, that the assignor of future property, once vested with the legal title, will be constituted as a bare constructive trustee for the assignee.
32 Does this have any impact upon the foregoing? The answer is 'no'-even if the assignment is considered to create an executory trust in favour of the assignee, it is still required to be in writing under the same statutory provisions as a regular executory contract.
33
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How Precisely the Land Must be Described In Order to Make the Assignment Effective
Assuming that the previous two issues are satisfied, a third issue requires consideration, namely, how precisely the land must be described in order to make the assignment effective. The most usual and straightforward way that this will be satisfied is when land is described in specific detail, so as to enable identification in the future. owner of the land and refuses to honour the contract, the assignee will have recourse to equity to make good the transfer.
A more difficult question is whether a 'general' assignment of land will be valid. Take the following example: if the assignor agrees to assign any and all land in their possession to the assignee at a future point in time determinable by a particular condition, will the requirement of descriptive specificity be sufficiently met so as to make the assignment binding? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the authorities on future assignments couched in general terms.
A requisite starting point is Holroyd v Marshall. 34 In that case Taylor, a damask manufacturer in Ovenden, York County, was in financial difficulties and sold machinery in his mill to AP and W Holroyd on terms which allowed Taylor to re-purchase for £5000. The machinery was transferred to Brunt, to hold it as trustee for Taylor absolutely if he should pay £5000 to AP and W Holroyd. The deed which set up this transaction included, 'all machinery, implements and things, which during the continuance of this security, shall be placed in or about' the mill. Taylor added further machinery to the mill without assuring it to the trustee, which his judgment creditors sought to levy execution against. AP and W Holroyd's title prevailed over that of Taylor's judgment creditors. Lord Westbury LC observed:
[I]f a vendor or mortgagor agrees to sell or mortgage property, real or personal, of which he is not possessed at the time, and he receives the consideration for the contract, and afterwards becomes possessed of property answering the description in the contract, there is no doubt that a Court of Equity would compel him to perform the contract, and that the contract would, in equity, transfer the beneficial interest to the mortgagee or purchaser immediately on the property being acquired. This, of course, assumes that the supposed contract is one of that class of which a Court of Equity would decree specific performance.
35
The Lord Chancellor thus held that the assignment of future property would be ineffective, if, at the date when the future property enters the assignor's hands, the court would decline an order for specific performance of the contract to assign. This dictum subsequently caused difficulties for lower level courts which felt compelled to render assignments of future property ineffective if they were described in general, as opposed to specific, terms.
In Belding v Read, 36 for example, the court was required to decide the degree of descriptive specificity necessary for the assignment of future property. The assignor, Randelstone, carried on a business as a grocer and draper, and had assigned to Read all his personal estate and effects, 'thereafter to be upon or about his dwelling house, farm and premises, situate in … Reedham or elsewhere in Great Britain.' Read had seized and sold personalty acquired by the assignor after the execution of the deed, some of it having been taken from a dwelling house in Reedham, and some from another property in Great Yarmouth. The plaintiff, who was the trustee in bankruptcy of the assignor's estate, demanded an account of the property seized by Read. The court ultimately found that the assignment failed as it was cast too generally, lacking the requisite descriptive specificity. 37 The court endorsed the position that an assignment of future property would only be binding if it was amenable to an order for specific performance. Martin B, for example, stated that, 'equitable title to goods as well as land is confined to specific goods, and does not extend to goods which are undetermined.'
38 Martin B continued that in Holroyd v Marshall, 39 'the property in dispute, which was new machinery, by being brought into the mill and affixed to the old machinery, was sufficiently earmarked to have entitled the mortgagee to file a bill for specific performance.' 40 Bramwell B also stressed the importance of descriptive specificity when assigning future property: [In Holroyd v Marshall] machinery, which in a sense was not specific when the deed was executed, having become specific by being brought into a particular mill, and made a part of its machinery, it was held that … a covenant or grant of this nature would confer an equitable interest in it. 41 Channell B similarly found that:
[I]n Holroyd v Marshall … the House of Lords appear only to have adopted and carried out that rule [what has been contracted to be done is to be considered done]. But the goods which formed the subject of that inquiry were goods of a specific character, brought upon the premises after the contract was made, and there affixed to and made part of the old machinery.
42
The court thus attempted to maintain fidelity to Lord Westbury LC's dicta in Holroyd v Marshall 43 by stressing the need for an assignment of future property to relate to specific, as opposed to general, property.
A similar method of reasoning was applied by Fry J in In re Count D'Epineuil (No 2) . 44 In that case the issue was whether a charge by the Count D'Épineuil 'of all my present and future personalty' in favour of the plaintiff, Tadman, was valid. Fry J, after considering Holroyd v Marshall 45 and Belding v Read, 46 held that 'equitable title to goods and land was confined to specific goods, and did not extend to goods which were 37 An exception was the judgment of Pollock CB at 961-62 which failed to acknowledge that equity allows the assignment of future property for valuable consideration. 38 49 the question of general and specific future property again emerged, this time in the context of an expectancy under a will. In that case the assignor, Hart, was a mortgagor, who had assigned to the mortgagee, South Essex Equitable Investments and Advances Company Limited, 'all moneys of or to which he then was or might during the security become entitled, under any settlement, will, or other document, either in his own right, or as a devisee, legatee, or next of kin of any person' and also all real and personal property 'of, in, or to which the mortgagor is or during this security shall become beneficially seised, possessed, entitled, or interested for any vested, contingent, or possible estate or interest.' Hart became entitled under the will of Clarke to a one twenty-third share of the residuary estate, and the testator's executor took out an originating summons to determine whether the share was included in Hart's mortgage. With reference to Clements v Matthews, 50 the court decided that the assignment was divisible into its constituent parts. 51 This meant that aspects of the agreement which were general in nature were ineffective, and those aspects which were specific, namely, the assignment for valuable consideration of all moneys to which the assignor should become entitled under a will, were effective. Bowen LJ presciently noted the unsatisfactory nature of Holroyd v Marshall 52 and the need for appellate clarification in this branch of equitable jurisdiction:
The time will come when the Court of Appeal will have to consider the law as to assignments of future property, and to lay down, if it can, for the guidance of the profession some more definite rule than is to be gathered from the cases since Holroyd v. Marshall. As it seems to me, language has been used in some of them which tends to confuse the two distinct ideas, of vagueness in the contract, and vagueness which arises from the difficulty of identifying future property. 'Vagueness' is a misleading term. A contract may be so vague in its terms that it cannot be understood, and in that case it is of no effect at law or in equity. There is another kind of vagueness which arises from the property not being ascertained at the date of the contract, but if at the time when the contract is sought to be enforced the property has come in esse and is capable of being identified as that to which the contract refers, I cannot see why there is in it any such vagueness as to prevent a Court of Equity from enforcing the contract. The question of specific and general future property reappeared in Official Receiver v Tailby. 54 In that case a mortgagor, Izon, a Birmingham packing case manufacturer, assigned to a mortgagee, Tyrrell, inter alia, 'all the book debts due and owing or which may during the continuance of this security become due and owing to the said mortgagor.' Izon later supplied Wilson Brothers & Co (WBC) with goods to the value of £10 7s 11d on credit. Subsequent to this, Tyrell died, and his executors sought to call in the money due to his estate. The executors demanded payments, took possession of the mortgaged premises and sold the books debts. Shortly thereafter, Tailby, who had acquired the book debt relating to WBC, gave notice to the firm demanding payment, which was duly satisfied. Izon, meanwhile, had become bankrupt. The question was whether Tailby had a title to the book debt which was better than the official receiver in the administration of Izon's bankrupt estate.
At first instance, the county court judge, relying on the authorities of 60 On further appeal, this result was reversed, with Lord Esher MR holding that the assignment of the future books debts was 'too vague', but if the assignment of the book debts had been confined to 'future book debts accruing due in a particular business' this would not be the case. 61 Lindley LJ took a similar view, explicitly linking the assignment of future property with specific performance:
The question, therefore, in such a case as this must, as it seems to me, be determined with reference to the doctrine of specific performance. I think that it would be going far beyond any of the cases that have been decided to say that specific performance would be decreed of such a contract as this. I do not say that an assignment of future book debts must necessarily be too vague; but, where there is no limitation of them with regard to any particular business, I think the assignment is too vague. Mere difficulty in ascertaining all the things which are included in a general assignment, whether in esse or in posse, will not affect the assignee's right to those things which are capable of ascertainment or are identified.
68
Lord Macnaghten explicitly clarified the relationship between the assignment of future property, the need for descriptive specificity and specific performance:
Greater confusion still, I think, would be caused by transferring considerations applicable to suits for specific performance … to cases of equitable assignment or specific lien. … The doctrines relating to specific performance do not, I think, afford a test or measure of the rights accrued.
69
The 78 In that case Burnard and Florence, trading as Burnard and Sons, had entered into a leasing agreement with Bridge Wholesale Corporation Australia Ltd (BWCAL) for forklift trucks and accessories for a period of forty-two months. On the same day, Burnard and Florence entered into a deed with BWCAL, which guaranteed payment of all money due under the lease. The deed allowed BWCAL, upon payment default, to place a legal mortgage over 'any land now or hereafter held' by Burnard and Florence. Default occurred and BWCAL lodged a caveat over Torrens land owned by Burnard claiming a right to a grant of a legal or equitable mortgage in respect of all outstanding moneys secured by the deed. On examining the reference to present and future land in the deed, Clarke JA stated:
[I]n Belding v Read (1865) 3 H & C 995; 159 ER 812, that an assignment by way of mortgage of all the mortgagors' personal estate and effects thereafter to be upon or about his dwelling-house, farm and premises situate at Reedham … or elsewhere in Great Britain failed both at law and at equity. This decision was followed in Re Count D'Epineuil (1882) 20 Ch D 758. In that case Fry J proceeded on the basis, which he drew from the judgment of Baron Martin in Belding, that the equitable title to goods as well as to land was confined to specific goods, and did not extend to goods which were 74 
79
His Honour thus affirmed that general assignments of future property would be effective. 80 Interestingly, Clarke JA was disinclined to the view that an assignment of future property couched in general terms might not be effective on the grounds of public policy, as intimated by Fry J in In re Count D'Epineuil (No 2) . 81 Rather, Clarke JA felt that existing protections with respect to hardship and unfairness would be adequate, although ultimately he noted that he did not need to reach a firm conclusion on the matter.
82
Before concluding the present section it is incumbent to observe that the current state of the law with respect to descriptive specificity and the assignment of future property represents a return to the position which preceded Holroyd v Marshall. 83 In Bennett v Cooper, 84 for example, Lord Langdale MR upheld an assignment 'if necessary, to sue for and receive, all sums of money then or thereafter to become due … and all legacies or bequests, which had already or might thereafter be given or bequeathed … by any person whomsoever.' Indeed two of the Law Lords in Tailby v Official Receiver 85 were at pains to refer to this case.
86
It emerges from the foregoing that there are no barriers to a general assignment of future land. Nor are there any barriers to a general assignment of future land and personalty. Thus, any suggestion that descriptive specificity is necessary in order to make an assignment of future land effective cannot be sustained. Having said this, it must still be possible to determine that there was an intention that the land in question would be included within the assignment's ambit at the time of the agreement. 87 In the final analysis, the validity of a general assignment of land will thus turn upon interpretation of the wording employed.
IV FUTURE PROPERTY AND TORRENS LAND
The relationship between equity and the Torrens system in the late nineteenth century was strained. This no doubt stemmed from the two paramount goals of the Torrens system: (1) to create a less complex land title system thereby reducing transaction costs; and (2) to provide title certainty in a colonial outpost with a dearth of legal skills necessary to properly administer common law title. 88 Robert Richard Torrens 89 pursued these two goals by instituting a land title system inspired by merchant shipping legislation which forbade the creation of equitable interests in ships. Early Torrens cases, such as Lange v Ruwoldt 90 echoed these influences, holding that equitable interests stood outside the Torrens statutory regime. 91 Over time, however, this view was rejected, 92 finally being laid definitively to rest in Barry v Heider. 93 Although today it could be scarcely denied that equitable interests are subsumable within the Torrens system, it is less certain precisely how principles of future property would apply to Torrens land. 94 Take the following example: X has an expectancy under Z's will to inherit Torrens land and makes an assignment of this expectancy to Y for valuable consideration. What are the legal implications? It is submitted that three issues beckon analysis: the nature of the interest created; the potential operation of the law of caveats; and the potential operation of the in personam exception to indefeasibility in the event that the assignor refuses to honour the contract. Each are discussed seriatim below.
A The Nature of the Interest Created
The Torrens system is one of 'title by registration' 95 meaning that the rights of the registered proprietor flow from the 'the act of registration and not from an event antecedent thereto.' 96 Would then the assignee's interest be capable of registration? The answer is 'no'. Two principal reasons can be advanced to justify this view. First, prior to the assignor taking the registered title, the nature of the assignee's right is highly contingent and to speak of registration in such a context would be nonsensical; how can one register an interest which may never eventuate? Second, even if the assignor becomes the registered proprietor, the assignee's interest remains equitable, akin to that of a beneficiary under a bare constructive trust, and is thus unable to be registered under the Torrens system. 97 This means that the interest of an assignee under a contract for sale of future Torrens land would be an unregistrable interest. 
The Exact Nature of the Assignee's Interest Prior to the Assignor Becoming the Registered Proprietor
It is interesting to consider the exact nature of the assignee's interest prior to the assignor becoming the registered proprietor. Clearly, it is contingent and thus unlike a regular equitable interest. This is reflected in the fact that an assignment of future property is said to only take effect once the legal title to the property vests in the assignor as bare constructive trustee.
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Does this mean that prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor, there is simply no equitable interest in favour of the assignee? This position, it would seem, is going too far. The contractual agreement to assign is, after all, created prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor. Moreover, various cases involving future property outside of the Torrens system have suggested that the assignee's equitable interest can transcend the assignor's bankruptcy. 99 Correspondingly, the assignee's right has been characterised as 'higher' than mere contract. 100 If this is the established law, it indicates that there must be an equitable interest, albeit nascent, torpid and nonproprietary, in favour of the assignee prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor.
Is then the assignee's equitable interest a mere equity? The answer is 'no'. A mere equity is generally considered to connote an equitable interest which requires the assistance of a court of equity in order to be perfected-an equitable mortgage established by the doctrine of part performance prior to a court of equity's validation is a good example. 102 The interest of an assignee of future land does not comport with this category of interest, as prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor, there is simply no existing proprietary interest which a court of equity can perfect.
This leads to the conclusion that prior to the registered title vesting in the assignor, there is a sui generis contingent equitable interest. 103 The hallmarks of this interest are nascence, torpidity, and non-proprietariness. 104 This interest may convert to a regular equitable interest endowed with a proprietary character if the registered title subsequently vests in the assignor. This conversion has been explained as an exceptional application of the equitable maxim, equity regards that as done which ought to be done.
105
B The Law of Caveats
It is uncontroversial that in the case of a regular contract for the sale of land the assignee has, prior to settlement, an equitable interest in the property which is capable of protection by caveat. 106 The question at the present juncture is whether a caveat could be lodged by the assignee of future Torrens land. No guidance exists in the case law on this issue. As indicated by Torrens legislation, however, a caveat can be lodged by any person in relation to an unregistered dealing who claims to be entitled to a legal or equitable estate or interest in land. 107 The question must be then: is the interest of an assignee of future Torrens land an equitable estate or interest in that land?
Prior to the assignor becoming the registered proprietor, the answer is 'no', as the equitable right which the assignee has is non-proprietary; it is, as noted above, a sui generis contingent equitable interest. An example may serve to better illustrate the conclusion. Assume that X has an expectancy under Z's will of Torrens land and agrees to make an assignment of that land to Y for valuable consideration. In these circumstances, it would be improper to allow Y to place a caveat upon Z's title. 108 Z is entirely removed from the contract concerning X and Y which is contingent. It is possible, for example, that Z may decide at any time to sell the property or may will the property elsewhere. 109 The result, however, is different once the assignor takes the registered title. This is because the element of contingency is eliminated, and the contractual obligations which exist between the assignor and assignee can be given proper effect; the sui generis contingent equitable interest is converted to a regular equitable interest. At this point, the assignee is able to lodge a caveat to protect their equitable interest in the land, having a stable proprietary interest. Interestingly, the lodging of a caveat in these circumstances has two currently recognised analogues: the interest of a purchaser under an executory contract for the sale of land, 110 On the other hand, if it is accepted that the assignor holds the land on bare constructive trust for the assignee, then it would seem that the assignee would enjoy a very high degree of protection from later equitable interests, due to the rule in Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v The Queen. 114 The latter provides that a beneficiary will not be postponed because a trustee has created further equitable interests contrary to his or her fiduciary office. For the purpose only of protection against notice, the estate or interest in land under the provisions of this Act, taken by a person under a dealing registrable, or which when appropriately signed by or on behalf of that person would be registrable under this Act shall, before registration of that dealing, be deemed to be a legal estate.
This means that provided the second assignee took bona fide for value and without notice of the original assignee's equitable interest, the second assignee would have an unregistered legal interest 120 and would take priority over the original assignee. The same protection would extend to any sale made by the second assignee in the period post-settlement and preregistration due to the successive effect doctrine articulated in Wilkes v Spooner.
121 Moreover, such protection would endure even when the new purchaser took with notice of the original assignee's interest under the future land contract. 124 cannot be used to allow a trustee (the original assignor under the future property contract) in breach of trust to sell to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice (second assignee), only to reacquire the legal title and thus defraud the trust's intended beneficiary (original assignee under the future land contract).
C Operation of the In Personam Exception to Torrens Indefeasibility in the Event that the Assignor Refuses to Honour the Contract
The in personam 125 exception to Torrens indefeasibility concerns claims that are made against a registered proprietor of land. 126 As the name of the exception suggests, it essentially concerns rights in personam or between parties, ensuring that a registered proprietor cannot use indefeasibility of title to avoid legal or equitable obligations. 127 An in personam claim is typically created by a registered proprietor either ante or post registration 128 and can also be created by a proprietor's agents or employees. 129 If registration is passed to a new proprietor unrelated to the in personam claim, then the new proprietor will not be bound, as the claim will not operate in rem. 130 In the majority of Australian jurisdictions, there is no legislative provision which refers to the in personam exception to indefeasibility. In circumstances where the assignor of future Torrens land has agreed for valuable consideration to sell the land to the assignee, but then later reneges upon the agreement and instead remains the registered proprietor, an in personam claim would arise. This new claim-failure to assure future Torrens land-draws inferential support from two closely related equitable analogues: the right of a purchaser to specific performance and the right of a beneficiary to compel the trust against a trustee.
A Purchaser's Right to Specific Performance
It was established very soon after the inception of the Torrens system that a purchaser can seek specific performance from the vendor in relation to an executory contract for the sale of land, notwithstanding the vendor's indefeasibility of title. 137 Put alternatively, the fact that the vendor is the registered proprietor cannot be raised as a defence against the remedy of specific performance. 138 Although the assignment of future property does not depend on a court's order of specific performance, 139 cases sourced from the general domain of specific performance in the Torrens context do establish that an assignment of future Torrens land cannot be negated by the assignor's indefeasibility of title.
A Beneficiary's Right to Compel the Trust Against a Trustee
Another in personam claim which is closely related to the failure to assure future Torrens land is the ability of a beneficiary to compel the trust against a trustee who is the registered proprietor: the trustee cannot refuse to transfer the land claiming indefeasibility of title. 140 In Boyd v Mayor, etc, of Wellington, 141 for example, Adams J noted that '[t]he power of the Court to enforce trusts, express or implied … has been repeatedly exercised.'
142 It follows that the same claim might also be applied in the context of a failure to assure future Torrens land. This stems from the fact that the assignor of future land is, upon taking the registered title, regarded as a bare constructive trustee for the assignee. 143 This means that the assignor will be required to transfer the registered title to the assignee forthwith, and that the indefeasibility provisions of Torrens legislation will be no barrier to this process.
to the assignee to enforce the assignor's conscientious obligations. Technically, this would be a new in personam claim: failure to assure future Torrens land.
Should the assignor of future Torrens land sell not to the original assignee, but to a new assignee who becomes the registered proprietor, indefeasibility of title will mean that the original assignee will only be left with contractual recourse against the assignor for breach of contract.
Although it might be surmised that Robert Torrens would lament the incorporation of 'prophetic conveyances' 147 within the system of 'title by registration' 148 which he helped to create, it is apparent that there is a place for future land contracts within that system. Equity's pre-modern jurisdiction and the relatively contemporary Torrens system can work together to give effect to future land transactions.
